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Abstract
We utilize the dynamics involved in the imaging of a fin-
gerprint on a touch-based fingerprint reader, such as per-
spiration, changes in skin color (blanching), and skin dis-
tortion, to differentiate real fingers from spoof (fake) fin-
gers. Specifically, we utilize a deep learning-based archi-
tecture (CNN-LSTM) trained end-to-end using sequences of
minutiae-centered local patches extracted from ten color
frames captured on a COTS fingerprint reader. A time-
distributed CNN (MobileNet-v1) extracts spatial features
from each local patch, while a bi-directional LSTM layer
learns the temporal relationship between the patches in the
sequence. Experimental results on a database of 26, 650
live frames from 685 subjects (1, 333 unique fingers), and
32, 910 spoof frames of 7 spoof materials (with 14 vari-
ants) shows the superiority of the proposed approach in
both known-material and cross-material (generalization)
scenarios. For instance, the proposed approach improves
the state-of-the-art cross-material performance from TDR
of 81.65% to 86.20% @ FDR = 0.2%.
1. Introduction
Fingerprint recognition technology is now widely
adopted across the globe for a plethora of applications, in-
cluding international border crossing1, forensics2, unlock-
ing smartphones3, and national ID4 programs. However,
one of the most critical premise for this wide acceptance is
that users have trust in the security of a fingerprint recog-
nition system, namely protection of enrolled fingerprints
(templates) and detection of fingerprint spoofs [17]. In this
paper, we focus on fingerprint spoof detection.
Fingerprint spoof attacks5 refer to finger-like artifacts
1https://www.dhs.gov/obim
2https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis
3https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT201371
4https://uidai.gov.in/
5Fingerprint spoofs are one of the most common forms of presentation
attacks (PA). The ISO standard IEC 30107-1:2016(E) defines presentation
Figure 1. A sequence of ten color frames are captured by a SilkID
SLK20R fingerprint reader in quick succession (8 fps). The first,
fifth, and tenth frames from a live (a) - (c), and spoof (tan pig-
mented third degree) (d) - (f) finger are shown here. Unlike spoofs,
in the case of live fingers, appearance of sweat near pores (high-
lighted in yellow boxes) and changes in skin color (pinkish red to
pale yellow) along the frames can be observed.
with an accurate imitation of one’s fingerprint fabricated
for the purpose of stealing their identity. Techniques rang-
ing from simple molding and casting to sophisticated 3D
printing have been utilized to create spoofs with high fi-
delity [18, 3, 8]. Various readily available and inexpensive
materials (e.g. gelatin, wood glue, play doh) can be used to
create spoofs that are capable of circumventing a fingerprint
recognition system. For instance, in March 2018, a gang
in Rajasthan (India) bypassed the biometric attendance sys-
tems, using wood glue spoofs casted in wax molds, to pro-
vide proxies for police academy entrance exams6.
attacks as the “presentation to the biometric data capture subsystem with
the goal of interfering with the operation of the biometric system”. Other
forms of PAs include use of altered fingers and cadavers.
6https://www.medianama.com/2018/03/223-cloned-
thumb-prints-used-to-spoof-biometrics-and-allow-
proxies-to-answer-online-rajasthan-police-exam/
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Table 1. Studies primarily focused on fingerprint spoof detection using temporal analysis.
Study Approach Database Performance
Parthasaradhi et al. [22] Temporal analysis of perspiration pattern
along friction ridges
1, 840 live from 33 subjects and
1800 spoof from 2 materials, and
700 cadaver from 14 fingers
Avg. Classification Accuracy = 90%
Kolberg et al. [14] Blood flow detection using a sequence of
40 Laser Speckle Contrast Images
1, 635 live from 163 subjects and
675 spoof images of 8 spoof
materials (32 variants)
TDR = 90.99% @ FDR = 0.05%
Plesh et al. [23] Fusion of static (LBP and CNN) and
dynamic (changes in color ratio) features
using a sequence of 2 color frames
14, 892 live and 21, 700 spoof
images of 10 materials
TDR = 96.45% (known-material) @
FDR = 0.2%
Proposed Approach Temporal analysis of minutiae-based local
patch sequences from 10 color frames using
CNN + LSTM model
26, 650 live from 685 subjects and
32, 910 spoof images of 7
materials (14 variants)
TDR = 99.15% (known-material)
and TDR = 86.20% (cross-material)
@ FDR = 0.2%
With the goal to detect such spoof attacks, various hard-
ware and software-based spoof detection approaches have
been proposed in literature [17]. The hardware-based ap-
proaches typically utilize specialized sensors to detect the
signs of vitality (blood flow, heartbeat, etc.) and/or sensing
technologies for sub-dermal imaging [14, 29, 7, 19]. On the
other hand, software-based approaches extract salient cues,
related to anatomical (pores) [25] and texture-based fea-
tures [30], from the captured fingerprint image(s). Chugh
et al. [6] utilized minutiae-based local patches to train deep
neural networks that achieves state-of-the-art spoof detec-
tion performance. Gonzalez-Soler et al. [10] proposed fu-
sion of feature encodings of dense-SIFT features for robust
spoof detection.
Software-based approaches can be further classified into
static and dynamic approaches based on the input. A static
approach extracts discriminative spatial features from a sin-
gle fingerprint image, while a dynamic approach utilizes an
image sequence to extract spatial and/or temporal features
for spoof detection. For a comprehensive review on the ex-
isting static approaches, readers are referred to [17, 9].
In the case of dynamic approaches, published studies uti-
lize temporal analysis to capture the physiological features,
such as perspiration [22, 16], blood flow [31, 14], skin dis-
tortion [1], and color change [31, 23]. Table 1 summarizes
the dynamic approaches for fingerprint spoof detection re-
ported in the literature. Some of the limitations of these
studies include long capture time (2-5 seconds), expensive
hardware, and/or small number of frames in the sequence.
Moreover, it is likely that some live fingers may not exhibit
any of these dynamic phenomenons to separate them from
spoofs. For instance, some dry fingers may not exhibit signs
of perspiration during the finger presentation or a spoof may
produce similar distortion characteristics as that of some
live fingers.
We posit that automatic learning, as opposed to hand-
engineering, of the dynamic features involved in the pre-
sentation of a finger can provide more robust and highly
discriminating cues to distinguish live from spoofs. In this
study, we propose to use a CNN-LSTM architecture to learn
the spatio-temporal features across different frames in a se-
quence. We utilize a sequence of minutiae-centered local
patches extracted from ten colored frames captured by a
COTS fingerprint reader, SilkID SLK20R7, at 8 fps to train
the network in an end-to-end manner. The use of minutiae-
based local patches has been shown to achieve state-of-the-
art spoof detection performance compared to randomly se-
lected local patches in static images [5]. Additionally, us-
ing minutiae-based local patches provides a large amount
of training data, 71, 530 minutiae-based patch sequences,
compared to 5, 956 whole-frame sequences.
The main contributions of this study are:
• Utilized sequences of minutiae-based local patches to
train a CNN-LSTM architecture with the goal of learn-
ing discriminative spatio-temporal features for finger-
print spoof detection. The local patches are extracted
from a sequence of ten colored frames captured in
quick succession (8 fps) using a COTS fingerprint
reader, SilkID SLK20R.
• Experimental results on a dataset of 26, 650 live cap-
tures from 685 subjects (1333 unique fingers) and
32, 930 spoof frames from 7 spoof materials (with 14
variants) shows that the proposed approach is able
to improve the state-of-the-art cross-material perfor-
mance from TDR of 81.65% to 86.20% @ FDR =
0.2%.
2. Proposed Approach
The proposed approach consists of: (a) detecting minu-
tiae from each of the frames and selecting the frame with
the highest number of minutiae as the reference frame, (b)
preprocessing the sequence of frames to convert them from
7https://www.zkteco.com/en/product_detail/
SLK20R.html
Figure 2. Examples of (i) live and (ii) spoof fingerprint images. (a) Grayscale 1000 ppi image, and (c)-(g) the first five (colored) frames
captured by SilkID SLK20R Fast Frame Rate reader. Live frames exhibit the phenomenon of blanching of the skin, i.e. displacement of
blood when a live finger is pressed on the glass platen changing the finger color from red/pink to pale white.
Bayer Pattern Image RGB Image
Partial Red Color Plane
Partial Green Color Plane
Partial Blue Color Plane
Bilinear Interpolation
Interpolated Red Color Plane
Interpolated Green Color Plane
Interpolated Blue Color Plane
Figure 3. A Bayer color filter array consists of alternating rows
of red-green and green-blue filters. Bilinear interpolation of each
channel is utilized to construct the RGB image.
Bayer pattern grayscale images to RGB images, (c) extract-
ing local patches (192 × 192) from all ten frames based on
the location of detected minutiae in the reference frame,
and (c) end-to-end training of a CNN-LSTM architecture
using the sequences of minutiae-centered patches extracted
from the ten frames. While a time-distributed CNN network
(MobileNet-v1) with shared weights extracts deep features
from the local patches, a bidirectional LSTM layer is uti-
lized to learn the temporal relationship between the features
extracted from the sequence. An overview of the proposed
approach is presented in Figure 4.
2.1. Minutia Detection
When a finger (or spoof) is presented to the SilkID
SLK20R fingerprint reader, it captures a sequence of ten
color frames, F = {f1, f2, ..., f10}, at 8 frames per sec-
ond8 (fps) and a resolution of 1000 ppi. While the com-
plete sensing region (h × w) in a SilkID fingerprint reader
is 800× 600 pixels, each of the ten colored frames are cap-
tured from a smaller central region of 630 × 390 pixels to
ensure the fast frame rate of 8 fps. The starting and end-
ing frames in the sequence may have little or no friction
ridge details if the finger is not yet completely placed or
quickly removed from the reader, respectively. Therefore,
we extract minutiae information from all of the ten frames
using the algorithm proposed by Cao et al. [4]. Since the
minutiae detector proposed in [4] is optimized for 500 ppi
fingerprint images, all frames are resized before extracting
the minutiae. The frame with the maximum number of de-
tected minutiae is selected as the reference frame (fref ) and
the corresponding minutiae set as the reference minutiae set
(Mref ).
2.2. Pre-processing
A digital sensor, containing a large array of photo-
sensitive sites (pixels), is typically used in conjunction with
a color filter array to permit only particular colors of light
8It takes an average of 1.25 seconds to capture a sequence of ten frames.
at each pixel. SilkID fingerprint reader employs one of the
most common filter arrays, called as Bayer filter array, con-
sisting of alternating rows of red-green (RG) and green-
blue (GB) filters. Bayer demosaicing [15] (debayering) is
the process of converting a bayer pattern image to an im-
age with complete RGB color information at each pixel. It
utilizes bilinear interpolation technique [28] to estimate the
missing pixels in the three color planes as shown in Fig-
ure 3. The original sequence of grayscale Bayer pattern
frames (10 × 630 × 390) is converted to RGB colorspace
using an OpenCV [2] function, cv2.cvtColor(), with the pa-
rameter flag = cv2.COLOR BAYER BG2RGB. After de-
bayering, the frames have high pixel intensity values in the
green channel (see Figure 4) as SilkID readers are calibrated
with strong gains on green pixels for generating high qual-
ity FTIR images. We utilize these raw images for our ex-
periments. For visualization purposes, we reduce the green
channel intensity values by a factor of 0.58 and perform
histogram equalization on intensity value in the HSV col-
orspace9 (see Figures 1 and 2).
2.3. Local Patch Extraction
For each of the detected minutiae from the reference
frame, mi ∈ Mref , we extract a sequence of ten local
patches, Pi = {pf1i , pf2i , ..., pf10i }, of size 192 × 192, from
the ten frames (F ), centered at the minutiae location10, i.e.
mi = {xi, yi}. This results in a total of k patch sequences,
where k is equal to the number of detected minutiae in the
reference frame. Chugh et al. [5] reported that for 500
ppi fingerprint images, the minutiae-based patches of size
96 × 96 pixels achieved the best performance compared to
patch sizes of 64× 64 pixels and 128× 128 pixels. There-
fore, for 1000 ppi images in our case, we selected the patch
size of 192 × 192 pixels to ensure similar amount of fric-
tion ridge area in each patch, as contained in 96× 96 pixels
patch size for 500 ppi fingerprint images.. Each local patch
from the reference frame is centered around the minutiae.
However, this might not hold true for non-reference frames
where the minutiae may shift due to non-linear distortion of
human skin and non-rigid spoof materials. We hypothesize
that the proposed approach can utilize the differences in the
non-linear shift along the sequences of local patches as a
salient cue to distinguish between live and spoof presenta-
tions.
2.4. Network Architecture
Several deep Convolutional Neural Network (CNN)
architectures, such as VGG [26], Inception-v3 [27],
9Reducing gain in green channel and histogram equalization achieved
similar or lower performance compared to using raw color images. There-
fore, raw images were used for all experiments.
10Minutiae coordinates extracted from the resized 500 ppi frames are
doubled to correspond to minutiae coordinates in the original 1000 ppi
frames.
Figure 4. An overview of the proposed approach utilizing a CNN-LSTM model trained end-to-end on sequences of minutiae-centered local
patches for fingerprint spoof detection.
MobileNet-v1 [12] etc., have been shown to achieve state-
of-the-art performance for many vision-based tasks, includ-
ing fingerprint spoof detection [20, 5]. Unlike traditional
approaches where spatial filters are hand-engineered, CNNs
can automatically learn salient features from the given im-
age databases. However, as CNNs are feed-forward net-
works, they are not well-suited to capture the temporal dy-
namics involved in a sequence of images. On the other
hand, a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) architecture with
feedback connections can process a sequence of data to
learn the temporal features.
With the goal of learning highly discriminative and gen-
eralizable spatio-temporal features for fingerprint spoof de-
tection, we utilize a joint CNN-RNN architecture that can
extract deep spatial features from each frame, and learn
the temporal relationship across the sequence. One of the
most popular RNN architectures is Long Short-Term Mem-
ory [11] that can learn long range dependencies from the in-
put sequences. The proposed network architecture utilizes a
time-distributed MobileNet-v1 CNN architecture followed
by a Bi-directional LSTM layer11 and a 2-unit softmax layer
for the binary classification problem i.e. live vs. spoof. See
Figure 4.
MobileNet-v1 is a low-latency network with only 4.24M
trainable parameters compared to other networks, such as
Inception-v3 (23.2M) and VGG (138M), which achieve
comparable performance in large-scale vision tasks [24].
In low resource requirements such as smartphones and em-
bedded devices, MobileNet-v1 is well-suited for real-time
spoof detection. Most importantly, it has been shown to
11Experiments with uni-directional LSTM layer achieved lower or sim-
ilar performance compared to when using bi-directional layer.
Table 2. Summary of the fingerprint database utilized in this study.
Spoof Material Mold Type # Presentations # Frames
Ecoflex silicone
• Ecoflex 00-35, flesh tone pigment Dental 757 7, 570
• Ecoflex 00-50, flesh tone pigment 3D Printed 138 1, 380
• Ecoflex 00-50, tan pigment 3D Printed 130 1, 300
Gelatin
• Ballistic gelatin, flesh tone dye 3D Printed 50 500
• Knox gelatin, clear 3D Printed 84 840
Third degree silicone
• Light flesh tone pigment Dental 131 1, 310
• Tan pigment Dental 98 980
• Beige suede powder Dental 43 430
•Medium flesh tone pigment Dental 36 360
Crayola Model Magic
•White color Dental 910 9, 100
• Red color Dental 308 3, 080
Pigmented Dragon Skin (flesh tone) Dental 452 4, 520
Conductive Silicone 3D Printed 87 870
Unknown Spoof (JHU-APL) 3D Printed 67 670
Total Spoofs 3,291 32,910
Total Lives (685 subjects) 2,665 26,650
Table 3. Performance comparison (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2%)
between the proposed approach and the state-of-the-art [6] for
known-material scenario, where the spoof materials used in testing
are also known during training.
Approach Architecture TDR (%) (± s.d.) @
FDR = 0.2%
Still (Whole Image) CNN 96.90 ± 0.78
Still (Minutiae Patches) [6] CNN 99.11 ± 0.24
Sequence (Whole Frames) CNN-LSTM 98.93 ± 0.44
Sequence (Minutiae Patches) CNN-LSTM 99.25 ± 0.22
achieve state-of-the-art performance for fingerprint spoof
detection [6] on publicly available datasets [9]. It takes an
input image of size 224 × 224 × 3, and outputs a 1024-
dimensional feature vector (bottleneck layer). We resize
the local patches from 192 × 192 to 224 × 224 as required
by the MobileNet-v1 input. For the purposes of process-
ing a sequence of images, we utilize a Keras’ TimeDis-
tributed wrapper to utilize the MobileNet-v1 architecture as
a feature extractor with shared parameters across different
frames (time-steps) in the sequence.
2.5. Implementation Details
The network architecture is designed in the Keras frame-
work12 and trained from scratch on a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti
GPU. We utilize the MobileNet-v1 architecture without
its last layer wrapped in a Time-Distributed layer. The
Bi-directional LSTM layer contains 256 units and has a
dropout rate of 0.25. We utilize Adam [13] optimizer with a
learning rate of 0.001 and a binary cross entropy loss func-
12https://keras.io/
tion. The network is trained end-to-end with a batch size of
4. The network is trained for 80 epochs with early-stopping
and patience = 20.
3. Experimental Results
3.1. Database
In this study, we utilize a large-scale fingerprint database
of 26, 650 live frames from 685 subjects, and 32, 930 spoof
frames of 7 materials (14 variants) collected on SilkID
SLK20R fingerprint reader. This database is constructed by
combining fingerprint images collected from two sources.
First, as part of the IARPA ODIN program [21], a large-
scale Government Controlled Test (GCT-3) was conducted
at Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
(JHUAPL) facility in Nov. 2019, where a total of 685 sub-
jects with diverse demographics (in terms of age, profes-
sion, gender, and race) were recruited to present their real
(live) as well as spoof biometric data (fingerprint, face, and
iris). The spoof fingerprints were fabricated using 5 dif-
ferent spoof materials (11 variants) and a variety of fabri-
cation techniques, including use of dental and 3D printed
molds. For a balanced live and spoof data distribution, we
utilize only right thumb and right index fingerprint images
for the live data. Second, we collected spoof data in a lab
setting13 using dental molds casted with three different ma-
terials, namely ecoflex (with flesh tone pigment), crayola
model magic (red and white colors), and dragon skin (with
13This database will be made accessible to the interested researchers
after signing a license agreement.
Table 4. Performance comparison (TDR (%) @ FDR = 0.2%) between the proposed approach and the state-of-the-art [6] for three cross-
material scenarios, where the spoof materials used in testing are unknown during training.
Baselines Proposed Approach
Unknown Material Whole Image
(Grayscale)
Fingerprint Spoof
Buster [6]
Sequence of Whole
Images
Sequence of Minutiae-based
Patches
Third Degree 43.83 79.20 80.44 84.50
Gelatin 50.74 76.52 73.88 82.81
Ecoflex 77.37 89.23 87.55 91.28
Mean ± s.d. 57.31 ± 17.71 81.65± 6.70 80.62± 6.84 86.20 ± 4.48
flesh tone pigment). The details of the combined database
are summarized in Table 2.
3.2. Results
To demonstrate the robustness of our proposed approach,
we evaluate it under two different settings, namely Known-
Material and Cross-Material scenarios.
3.2.1 Known-Material Scenario
In this scenario, the same set of spoof materials are included
in the train and test sets. To evaluate this, we utilize five-
fold cross validation splitting the live and spoof datasets in
80/20 splits for training and testing with no subject overlap.
In each of the five folds, there are 21, 320 live and 26, 400
spoof frames in training and rest in testing. Table 3 presents
the results achieved by the proposed approach on known-
materials compared to a state-of-the-art approach [6] that
utilizes minutiae-based local patches from static grayscale
images. The proposed approach improves the spoof detec-
tion performance from TDR of 99.11% to 99.25% @ FDR
= 0.2%.
3.2.2 Cross-Material Scenario
In this scenario, the spoof materials used in the test set
are unknown during training. We simulate this scenario
by adopting a leave-one-out protocol, where one material
(including all its variants) is removed from training, and it
used for evaluating the trained model. It is a more chal-
lenging and practical setting as it evaluates the generaliz-
ability of a spoof detector against spoofs that are never seen
during training. For instance, in one of the cross-material
experiments, we exclude all of the third degree spoofs (pig-
mented, tan, beige powder, and medium) from training, and
use them for testing. The live data is randomly divided in a
80/20 split, with no subject overlap, for training and testing,
respectively. The proposed approach improves the cross-
material spoof detection performance from TDR of 81.65%
to 86.20% @ FDR = 0.2%. Table 4 presents the spoof de-
tection performance achieved by the proposed approach, on
three cross-material experiments, compared to a state-of-
the-art approach.
3.3. Processing Times
The proposed network architecture takes around 4 − 6
hours to converge when trained with sequences of whole
frames, and 24−30 hours with sequences of minutiae-based
local patches, using a Nvidia GTX 1080Ti GPU. An average
of 11 (13) sequences of minutiae-based local patches are ex-
tracted from the live (spoof) frames. The average classifica-
tion time for a single presentation, including preprocessing,
minutiae-detection, patch extraction, and sequence genera-
tion and inference, on a Nvidia GTX 1080 Ti GPU is 58ms
for full frame-based sequences, and 393ms for minutiae-
based patch sequences.
4. Conclusions
A robust and generalizable spoof detector is pivotal in
the security and privacy of fingerprint recognition systems
against unknown spoof attacks. In this study, we utilized
a sequence of local patches centered at detected minutiae
from ten color frames captured at 8 fps as the finger is pre-
sented on the sensor. We posit that the dynamics involved in
the presentation of a finger, such as skin blanching, distor-
tion, and perspiration, provide discriminating cues to distin-
guish live from spoofs. We utilize a jointly learned CNN-
LSTM model to learn the spatio-temporal dynamics across
different frames in the sequence. The proposed approach
improves the spoof detection performance from TDR of
99.11% to 99.25% @ FDR = 0.2% in known-material sce-
narios, and from TDR of 81.65% to 86.20% @ FDR = 0.2%
in cross-material scenarios. In future, we will explore the
use of live sequences to learn a one-class classifier for gen-
eralized fingerprint spoof detection.
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